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Parcerias estratégicas do Brasil: um balanço  
da era Lula (2003 – 2010)
ANtôNIO CArLOS LESSA*
introduction
During President Lula da Silva’s two terms in office (2003-2010), Brazilian 
diplomacy worked to reinforce the country’s relations with its traditional partners, 
particularly the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, but also assigned priority 
to establishing new dynamic axes, as illustrated by the pursuit of partnerships 
with countries such as South Africa, India, and China. These adjustments and 
fine-tuning of bilateral relations laid the foundation of universalism in Brazilian 
foreign policy, as well as defining major lineaments for the country’s international 
performance, namely, consolidation of economic relations (from the standpoint 
of trade currents and investment flows) and closer political cooperation at the 
highest level.
Starting from an analysis of the idea of “strategic partnerships” and of 
how it evolved through Brazil’s international experience, this article will assess 
the development of this concept in recent years. The purpose is to stress the 
importance of the effort toward diversification and the sophistication of the 
political and economic ties with a view to the strategy for Brazil’s incorporation 
into the international scene, as well as seeing how it relates to other movements, 
such as the pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
a complex incorporation into the international scene
The years that separate the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 
2001 constituted a peculiar moment in international life. While free trade and 
democracy asserted themselves as supreme values for the organization of the 
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economies and for the political life of the National States, there also occurred 
the emergence of new political operating modes among nations and of new issues 
that rapidly became central to International relations.
There occurred a drastic oscillation in the behavior of the central actors 
in international relations, especially of the United States, as well as a tendency 
to value political and economic multilateralism, including the establishment or 
sophistication of regionalization projects. At the same time, on the international 
agenda predominated new issues, such as human rights, the environment and 
environmental governance, sustainable development, fair trade, energy, food 
security, new security issues raised by defense challenges, nuclear nonproliferation, 
democracy, and migration, among others.
The way these issues have evolved since, their modes of operation and 
particularly the way they have influenced each other were fundamental for 
determining all relevant countries’ strategies of incorporation into the international 
scene, as well as conditioning their economic development strategies. This was 
particularly the case of Brazil’s integration into the international scene, which has 
been complex and not free of hesitations and oscillations.
After a decade of experiments in foreign policy, which led first to the reversion 
of traditional behavior patterns, the shrinking of the diplomatic network, and 
the depleting of the bilateral contact assets, and especially to the valorization 
of multilateralism, these experiments gave rise to a new formula as of 2000 but 
particularly as of 2003. Firm action in multilateral spaces had its counterpart 
in the reconstruction of geographic universalism, which in turn acquired a new 
sense of priority. The revaluing of priority bilateral contacts, which in Brazilian 
traditional diplomatic praxis are known as “strategic partnerships,” forms part of 
this new pattern. As a result, new dynamism has been injected into the economic 
expansion process, the trade and investment flows, and a new capacity of political 
coordination was achieved.
Changes in the international scene since the 2000s and the change in the 
perception of the great emerging markets have greatly influenced the conditions of 
Brazil’s international visibility. The perpetuation of the country’s firm command 
on economic stability strategy has also contributed to project the image of a large, 
stable mass consumption market. On the international scene, Brazil has displayed 
an assertive profile, as seen for instance in the determination with which diplomacy 
has aimed at a protagonist role in the unfolding of negotiations in respect of the 
most diverse issues on the contemporary agenda.
The direct and indirect consequences of the events since 9/11 have had a 
decisive impact on the setting of new priorities on the global security agenda, 
and have shown the need to reinforce multilateralism and strengthen multipolar 
international order. In the economic sphere, the pressing need for a new form of 
trade liberalization led to the launching of another round of trade negotiations 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization-WTO. On the environmental 
























agenda, the impact, risks, and costs stemming from climate change, which has 
become more evident in recent years, have called the attention of the governments 
of some of the rich countries to the need of giving priority to cooperation in the 
search for alternative energy sources.
The intertwining of these three new agendas has created a unique opportunity 
for Brazil, whose government has since 2003 enthusiastically sought more room 
for South-South and North-South political coordination. Though its chances 
to act as a protagonist in respect of the global security agenda were meager, 
the same cannot be said in relation to the debate regarding the legitimacy of 
contemporary international policy and the need of reforming and valorizing 
multilateral institutions.
Still in 2003, at the World Trade Organization Conference in Cancún, 
Brazil took the leadership of the emerging countries, in opposition to the historical 
practice whereby the rules of international trade are negotiated and decided by 
the developed countries. The formation of the Group of 20 (G-20) and then the 
mandate as negotiator in WTO’s Doha Round were moments when the new 
group sought to condition the opening of the services and industrial markets 
of southern countries to the corresponding opening of the northern countries’ 
agricultural markets.
In respect to the climate change agenda, Brazil does not act as an actual 
protagonist but as a holder of significant assets. The country’s technological 
development and especially its many competitive advantages regarding biofuels 
production chain are factors of the innovating profile it displays in international 
action, with significant repercussions on its agenda of cooperation with both 
northern and southern countries.
In the regional sphere, Brazil’s leadership role has become more prominent, 
although contested by some neighbors, particularly Venezuela and Argentina. 
In addition, the Brazilian government has demonstrated concern over regional 
political developments and has involved itself in stabilization experiences, as 
illustrated by its participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
In addition, it has sought a new modus operandi on different chessboards of 
contemporary international policy. The dedication with which Brazilian diplomacy 
has sought new coalitions, established around new issues and agendas, is an 
indication of an instigating vision. These coalitions include the IBSA Forum, 
formed by India, Brazil, and South Africa, and the Group of 4, formed by 
Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India to fight for the reform of the United Nations 
institutions. These coalitions were attempts to coordinate two sets of ideas:
1. The worldview of a country that sees itself as a regional power on a 
peaceful ascent, a major emerging market, a promoter of a genuinely multipolar 
international order, under which multilateral spaces are an essential condition; and
2. A bold view of international policy and an essentially positive reading 
according to which current international circumstances favor a review of the 
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decision-making mechanisms in different arenas. This is so because of the relative 
weight that countries such as Brazil bring to bear on the processes of stabilization 
of their respective power subsystems, as well as the fact that these countries 
(particularly Brazil) hold diplomatic assets that are highly important for major 
agendas and negotiations. This is so, for instance, in regard to international trade, 
as well as to the environment, and more specifically, to climate change.
This kind of coordination shows the exact measure of an ambitious strategy of 
certain costs and doubtful gains. Brazil must prepare itself to have greater influence 
on international processes and specifically on the formulation of norms (without 
feeling constrained) that dramatically limit its interests as a regional power as 
well as its development possibilities. Accordingly, this explains the objective of a 
significant part of the major turns of Brazilian foreign policy in the Lula da Silva 
era: the pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
This is one of the three main ambitious objectives that explain the marked 
changes in the Brazilian system of bilateral relations since 2003. The other two 
ambitious objectives that have contributed to restore the universalist character of 
the country’s international conduct until the early 1990s are related to economic 
expansion: (a) Restoration of the traditional trade channels (with Europe, United 
States, Japan, and South America, for instance) and the valorization of traditionally 
poorly explored economic relations (with Africa, China, the Arab World, and Asian 
regions, for instance); and (b) the opening of spaces for the operation of Brazilian 
business conglomerates, especially in strategic sectors (such as oil and ethanol).
These three lines of action required an extraordinary effort to expand 
bilateral ties in every direction. The first thing was the sophistication of the 
agenda of cooperation with traditional partners, especially with Europe, and to 
a lesser degree with China, India, Japan, and South Africa. The second was the 
extension of the diplomatic network to previously untouched limits, endowing 
with a priority political sense the establishment of new ties with countries and 
regions with which Brazil had historically maintained weak relations. Together, 
these two facets of the country’s incorporation into the international scene with 
a universalist impetus led to a revaluation of the “strategic partnerships” concept.
The strategic partnerships concept in brazil’s international experience
The idea of “strategic partnerships” acquired an unequivocal meaning in 
Brazil’s international experience in the 1970s and 1980s. It arose as a category 
of Brazilian diplomatic thinking in the context of the rapid change in relations 
with the United States under President Geisel (1974-1979). At that time, the 
idea became operational owing to the decision to speedily valorize relations with 
Eastern European countries, so as to mitigate the effects of the deterioration of 
the political and economic relationship with Washington. The movement had 
major consequences: it confirmed the importance of diversifying foreign links, 
























which came to pass only under a system of bilateral relations of a universal cast 
(Lessa, 1995; Lima, 1996).
The strategic partnership with European countries, in turn, conceived as an 
escape valve for the tensions from bilateral relations with the United States, did 
not survive the changed international political and economic situation in the late 
1970s. Nevertheless, it allowed interesting experiments from a political standpoint, 
such as the nuclear agreement with Germany (1975) and the involvement in the 
discussion about a new international economic order, which did not prosper either.
In the economic sphere, when the consequences of the first oil shock (1973) 
could still be felt, the dynamics of approximation with the European countries 
allowed the reversion of the United States’s historical preponderance in trade and 
investment flows into Brazil. As a result of this and of the consolidation of the 
universalizing opening then adopted (pursuit of new relationships, opening toward 
Africa, recognition of the People’s Republic of China, etc.), Brazil managed to 
secure a more balanced incorporation into the international scene – or at least 
established highly diversified economic ties.
This first experiment in “strategic partnerships” with European countries was 
the first movement that firmed up this concept in Brazilian diplomatic thinking. 
It can be said that this first generation of “partnerships” established the prototype 
of relationships called strategic. From this standpoint, strategic partnerships are 
“priority political and economic relations, reciprocally compensating, established 
on the basis of an accumulation of bilateral relations of a universal nature. The 
building of strategic partnerships rests on the harmonization of Brazil’s historical 
calling for universalism and the need for selective approximations, which ensures 
the possibility of adaptation to the niches of opportunity and to international 
constraints arisen from circumstances (Lessa, 1998).”
The concept of strategic partnerships thus established itself in Brazilian 
diplomatic thinking with a definitive meaning. A historical analysis of foreign 
policy relates it to the search for inputs for the national development strategy 
(Cervo, 2008). Thus, the expression’s vulgarization led to its inconsequential use 
in the diplomatic discourse, especially as of the 2000s. Now diplomacy expects 
to inject a sense of opportunity and urgency into the political discourse and the 
economic relationship with as many “partners” as seem to be useful in the current 
aggiornamento of Brazil’s international profile.
Be as it may, either from the perspective of historical analysis or in light 
of a careful examination of experiments under way, the expression “strategic 
partnerships” today needs further clarification. This is all the more obvious in 
view of the proliferation of ties that in the Brazilian government’s view (especially 
since 2004) deserve to be called “strategic.” After all, what kind of relationship 
deserves to be so called?
It can be noticed also that during the Lula era, the strategic partnerships 
concept has served to the carrying out of a spectacle-inclined diplomacy. This is 
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illustrated by the focus on the achievement of complex objectives of quite uncertain 
results, such as the pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council. This pursuit is particularly on its own behalf but it is also moved by 
the desire to project a new international image of a responsible regional power 
and emerging economy attuned to market values and endowed with attributes 
that qualify it as an actor ready to participate in the dynamics of stabilization 
of the international system in its multiple dimensions. Accordingly, the country 
has sought an international protagonist role, for which the “vulgarization” of the 
concept of strategic partnerships may have been useful.
The epistemological problem raised by this “new generation” of strategic 
partnerships is precisely the loss of meaning and importance of the concept as it was 
established by Brazil’s international experience. A strategic partnership thus ceases 
to be an expression of a bilaterally defined agenda around political convergence 
and economic projects and becomes a mere label. It may happen that under this 
label complex projects and potentially valid agendas may be implemented, but it 
would be expected that essentially normative views of the relationship’s reality in 
question would predominate. It is thus necessary to establish a new framework 
for future bilateral relations, possibly determined by political coordination 
mechanisms (regular summit meetings and joint commissions) and by specific 
agendas (energy, sustainable development, trade, investments, etc.)
This is not the place to make an exhaustive assessment of these ties, but there 
is a clear, nearly self-evident measure for them. Thus, empirical reality, which 
would permit testing the strategic partnership concept in Brazil’s international 
praxis, could be obtained by an examination of the trade and investment flows, 
the density of political dialogue, the potential of scientific and technological 
cooperation, the dialogue channels, the convergence of agendas at multilateral 
forums, and the involvement in joint development projects. 
Fundamental partnerships: united States and argentina
The most fundamental system of Brazilian bilateral relations, on whose basis 
the intensity of ties with other countries may be measured, has been historically 
related to the United States. It may be said that this is a “fundamental partnership”, 
which gives rise to the need for diversification of external ties and to the very 
historical process of building strategic partnerships (Lessa, 1998).
From this standpoint, relations with the United States should be classified 
as a “structuring relationship” because its development over the long term gives 
a measure of the intensity and organization of the entire system of Brazil’s 
international relations, especially in the period from 1945-1990.
Relations between Brazil and the United States have undergone significant 
changes since the 1990s. These changes can be explained by the difference in the 
management of a relationship that had been built in the previous thirty years as 
























a basically contentious relationship. As a matter of fact, bilateral relations had 
deteriorated to such a degree in the late 1980s, involving issues such as market 
access, science and technology, intellectual property, foreign debt, and development 
financing that this rapidly contaminated the rather poor political dialogue. 
The fact is that the two traditional partners were already following different 
courses in respect of punctual issues since at least the late 1950s. This pattern of 
disagreement can be explained by many factors, including the loss of economic 
complementariness, one of the major reasons. 
Stabilization of relations with the United States, which began under the 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1994-2000), permitted the setting 
up of a positive agenda that incorporated the management mode traditionally 
characterized by tension peaks. Thus, the change had to do rather with the 
improved dialogue conditions and with the adoption of a specific mode of 
managing these relations, referred to by Hirst and Pinheiro (1995) as the “right 
to diverge.” It is true that the United States still ranked highest among Brazil’s 
economic partners, but for some decades relations were no longer characterized by 
economic dependence on the part of Brazil. This was also due to the stimulus to 
and prioritizing of political and economic relations with other developed countries 
(particularly with European countries).
As it was to be expected, there were problems in the handling of bilateral 
relations, connected with processes in which Brazil was involved. Governments 
tend to differ on trade issues, as illustrated by the episode of the negotiation of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas – FTAA as well as of trade liberalization, especially 
in the World Trade Organization’s context. In such cases, the mere existence of 
a multilateral framework (as for instance the rounds of negotiations aimed at 
trade liberalization and the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism) favored the 
empting of a possibly conflictive potential of bilateral relations regarding some of 
the burning issues on the contemporary international agenda.
There arose then a tendency to compartmentalize the bilateral agenda into 
two well-defined sectors: in the political negotiations between governments lie the 
differences regarding regional political processes (in the 1990s, the Colombian 
issue; in the 2000s, Venezuela’s case; and more recently, the Honduras episode), 
migrations, international security, etc. On the more general level of views of the 
international political processes, countries tend to differ about the great issues 
of international politics, where there is still a large grey area characterized by the 
differences as to the very importance of political multilateralism, institutions, and 
the achievement of a multipolar order. What is new in the management of bilateral 
relations is the fact that these compartments do not communicate with each other 
as they did before. Thus, the differences over the agenda and its implementation 
remain isolated and rarely compromise the overall quality of relations.
Relations with Argentina could also be easily qualified as strategic. But 
there are certain specificities that make Brazil’s relations with its major neighbor 
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unique, which could also be properly described as “a structuring relationship.” 
Indeed, relations with Argentina have conditioned the development of Brazilian 
policy toward South America, and the extraordinary transformation they have 
undergone since the 1980s has acquired a historic meaning, so that they could 
be described as a genuine Brazilian strategic partnership.
The Brasilia-Buenos Aires axis became a vector of South America’s stabilization, 
established upon the review and normalizing of bilateral relations since the casting 
away of reciprocal mistrust and the heralding of a new phase of convergence aimed 
at economic integration. Equally complex, relations with Argentina spearheaded 
Brazil’s regional activity, in both the political and the economic areas, and provided 
a basis for projects developed by Brazil on trade integration, security, and measures 
of political cooperation with other South American countries. These coordination 
mechanisms assumed different forms in the last two decades (Mercosur, Free Trade 
Area of the Americas – FTAA, South American Community of Nations-CASA, 
Union of South American Nations-Unasur).
Under the Lula government it has no longer been possible to separate 
the development of relations with Argentina from the development of regional 
integration mechanisms. Mercosur has tended to lose relevance on the overall list 
of Brazilian international priorities. At the same time, Argentina lost the first trade 
flow positions to Brazil, while providing room for the expansion of great Brazilian 
conglomerates, especially in the financial and energy sectors. 
Mercosur has been assigned no priority in the Brazilian diplomatic discourse 
under Lula. This economic space has been absorbed by the development of South 
American regional mechanisms, such as Unasur. Mercosur has thus become a 
difficult project to manage, to the point that several influential sectors in Brazil 
now openly call for its reduction to a free trade zone. It is argued that this might 
be advantageous to Brazil, in so far as the country would recover the capacity to 
negotiate free trade agreements with more important partners, such as the United 
States and the European Union.
The Argentine government under Néstor Kirchner fiercely resisted Brazil’s 
attempt at becoming the instrument of leadership in South America as a diplomatic 
asset. Cristina Kirchner, on the other hand, has been more pragmatic as to the 
potential “Brazilian ascent” to a global level and has wagered on restoring the 
quality of the relationship with Lula’s Brazil. In some segments of Argentine 
public opinion it has been possible to detect greater understanding of the gains 
that could be derived from Brazil’s protagonist role for their country, Mercosur, 
and South America.
new strategic partnerships
In recent years, the Brazilian government has sought to stamp as “strategic” 
its traditional relations with some countries. A far from exhaustive survey (Brasil, 
























Repertório, 2007) specially valorized this in relations with Asian powers (Japan, 
India, and China) and with the main European countries, namely, France, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and Italy, in addition to Russia. Brazil also 
maintains a “strategic partnership “with South Africa, and with it and India it 
forms the Group of Three (IBSA). But other countries have also been named 
“strategic partners” – South Korea, Venezuela, Paraguay, Ukraine, Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.
But it is possible to suppose, in view of the growing number of countries 
that have been named “strategic partners” in the diplomatic discourse, that the 
expression has been vulgarized and soon made into a style device by diplomacy 
and its agents. Used in an imprecise, abusive way, the expression begins to lose 
its meaning derived from historical experience and no longer signals importance, 
relevance, and priority in foreign policy’s strategic thinking (Abreu, 2008).
Some representative cases will now be looked into: Japan, China, India, 
South Africa, and the European Union.
 Japan
The establishment of a strategic partnership with Japan, of great potential, 
was interrupted in the early 1980’s in view of the first signs of the Brazilian 
economic crisis. The great project of this partnership was cooperation for Brazil’s 
agricultural development under the Japanese-Brazilian Cooperation Program 
for the Development of the Cerrados (Prodecer), conceived in 1974. Cooperation 
was not uninterested, of course, as the Japanese wanted to encourage the entry of 
a new player in the global grain market and thereby attenuate their nearly total 
dependence on the United States. Be as it may, both this program and the Japanese 
economic presence in Brazil are key components of an overall view of Brazilian 
development in the last three decades.
Economic relations with Japan lost their impetus in the 1980s and remained 
at the same level until 2005. On the other hand, an intense political agenda 
was kept, owing to a great extent to the question of the dekasseguis, the growing 
community of Brazilians of Japanese descent who migrated to Japan beginning 
in the 1980s in search of work opportunities. Trade indicators never grew to a 
significant degree, and investment flows remained below their potential.
The bilateral political and economic agenda gained a new impulse as of 2005. 
Two factors explain why Japan was included again on the list of Brazil’s strategic 
priorities. First, there was the perception on the part of the Japanese foreign 
policy operators that their country had actually lost major economic positions and 
conditions of dialogue with Brazil. Not less important, was the broaching of some 
initiatives that helped bring the two countries together again: the formation of 
the Group of 4, consisting of Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India, all four aspiring 
to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; and the choice of 
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the digital TV system in Brazil, potentially worth billions of dollars, which was 
decided in favor of the Japanese.
 China
Brazil’s relations with the People’s Republic of China date back to 1974, 
when the Ernesto Geisel’s government recognized the Chinese government and 
for the first time established Brazilian diplomatic relations with China. This 
meant a break with the position Brazil had maintained since 1949, of systematic 
support to the international isolation of the great Communist country. Though 
these relations are mature and long-standing, major joint projects under these 
relations were lacking.
China had intermittently signaled promise under Brazil’s international 
relations system, or at least until 1993, when the Itamar Franco government 
decided to make Asia in general into a priority region for Brazil’s international 
activity, and this was reiterated under both the Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
the Lula Administrations. Since 1995, China has acquired a unique status in the 
strategic thinking of Brazilian foreign policy, given its cooperation potential in 
the area of Science and Technology and the magnitude of its trade.
The development of the remote sensing satellite-CBERS (in two generations 
launched respectively in 1999 and in 2003) illustrates the nature of this 
relationship, which indeed holds an immense cooperation potential. One of the 
major gestures toward the strategic valorization of relations with China was made 
by President Lula who paid a State visit to China in 2004, taking with him the 
largest entourage ever of Brazilian businessmen on this kind of mission. Brazil 
supported China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, in the belief that 
this would indirectly contribute to the strengthening of the world trade system, 
because, given China’s immense domestic market, the Chinese might agree to 
compromises that would benefit the developing countries (Oliveira, 2004).
A key element in Brazil-China relations beginning under the Lula government 
is the potential for political cooperation in different aspects, and this makes this 
relationship into a true strategic partnership. In addition to being a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council, thus holding veto power to bar 
reforms in the organization’s structure, China has systematically sided with Brazil 
in respect of various issues and negotiation processes under the contemporary 
international agenda.
China has consistently grown as regards Brazilian trade flows in recent years, 
rapidly gaining top positions in the ranking of Brazil’s major trade partners. As 
a result of the economic crisis that has harmed Brazil-United States relations, in 
April 2010 China for the first time ranked first in our trade relations, surpassing 
the United States. This fact does not really constitute a tendency, as Brazil’s 
relations with its traditional partners (United States and Europe) are much better 
balanced, but nevertheless reflects the dynamism of Sino-Brazilian partnership.
























China is not only one of the greatest exporting countries, but also one of 
the world’s greatest importers as well. Currently the Chinese import in excess of 
US$1 trillion, which certainly means open doors to all the sectors of Brazilian 
economy, principally manufactures and consumer goods, in addition to basic 
products, such as iron ore and soybean. Brazil’s greatest challenge is precisely the 
need to balance its trade list, as it exports basically primary products (about 70 
percent of Brazilian exports consist of iron ore and soybean, whereas 95 percent 
of its imports consist of manufactures).
 India and South Africa
Brazil’s bilateral relations with India and South Africa have not been 
historically important, though long-standing. On both sides, there has been lack 
of dynamism and priority establishment. For different reasons, the two countries 
were assigned low priority under Brazilian foreign policy: Asia, where preferential 
ties were established with Japan; and Africa, a continent where Brazil’s expansion 
came late and was motivated principally by the needs of trade expansion.
India and Brazil have a history of political cooperation since the 1960s; it is 
highly dynamic at multilateral forums, especially in respect of international trade 
negotiations. But their economic relations have been decisively marginal in the 
second half of the 20th century and until the 2000s. India entered the political 
debate about Brazil’s international choices as of the 1990s, when the country 
realized the need to reorganize its presence in Asia and particularly its relations 
with continent-size countries that began to emerge politically and economically. 
The first systematic approximation with a view to prioritizing bilateral ties beyond 
potential cooperation at multilateral forums was initiated by the Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso government. This approach had an economic component, 
which did not develop properly, as well as a political coordination mechanism, 
which did not go much further either.
Relations with South Africa were dynamic until the early 1970s, when 
the Brazilian government decided to keep its distance from the South African 
segregationist regime that, as could be noticed then, hindered a consistent policy 
of approximation to the rest of the African continent. Starting then, Brazil 
systematically kept its distance from South Africa and joined the international 
majority that condemned apartheid. This situation lasted until the end of the 
regime, with Nelson Mandela’s election, and the normalization of South Africa’s 
international profile in 1995. The effort to reactivate bilateral relations has since 
included a restoration of the trade flows and the attempt at injecting dynamism 
into the political dialogue, but the truth is that at that time Brazil still attached 
low priority the African region and South America was still an unknown region 
to South Africa (Penna Filho, 2001).
Reactivation of Brazil’s relations with South Africa and India gained a new 
impetus early under the Lula government. In June 2003, the Ministry of Foreign 
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Relations announced the launching of the India-Brazil-South Africa – IBSA 
Dialogue Forum. This initiative was conceived as a coordination mechanism 
primarily of a political nature among the three countries, which, more than ever, 
are believed to have a greater potential for cooperating than for competing. They 
are three intermediary countries, regional powers, multiethnic, multicultural 
democracies that can derive mutual benefit from coordinated actions in different 
areas, as well as from exchanging experiences related to economic and social 
development.
The IBSA Forum is grounded on a conceptually interesting argument and 
rests on converging political positions and on the three countries’ potential for 
economic cooperation. This is certainly a model of trilateral strategic partnership, 
based on cooperation mechanisms and on the exchange of experiences with 
challenges common to all three.
 Europe
The announcement of the establishment of the European Common Market 
in 1957 caused the greatest concern on the part of the Brazilian government, 
which was fully convinced that European integration would entail a significant 
drop in exports of coffee and other traditional products. This would happen due 
to the redirection of trade to the benefit of our African competitors, which would 
be favored by measures of trade association that would guarantee them privileged 
access (under the provisions of Arts. 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome), not only into 
France and Belgium but also into most partners, including two of Brazil’s major 
trade partners in the world, namely, Germany and Italy (Lessa, 1998).
This less than auspicious beginning defined the character of the history of 
Brazilian relations with the European integration process in its earlier decades. 
Whereas Brazil’s bilateral relations with the European States flowed unimpeded, 
free since then of trade disputes (which had been significant in some cases, such 
as with France), this heavy agenda, over which the parties seldom agreed, was 
reinforced precisely by the establishment of the European Common Market 
(Bueno, 1994).
The establishment of the Common Market entailed a major rupture of the 
European nucleus of Brazilian bilateral relations: it produced an axis of conflict, 
previously inexistent, which survived practically until the mid-1990s, centered on 
the handling of trade issues, especially market access and tariff treatment (Lessa, 
1998). During this long period, there was no talk of political cooperation, as Latin 
America in general constituted a blind spot on the list of European community’s 
international priorities.
On the other hand, it was at that moment that Brazil established relations 
with a significant number of European countries. These relations rapidly evolved 
into innovative forms of political and economic cooperation, as shown, for 
























instance, by the diversification of foreign links established under the Ernesto 
Geisel government (1974-1979) (Lessa, 1995).
Those were the first steps toward strategic partnerships, as the Brazilian 
diplomatic thinking would conceive it: a strategic partnership with European 
countries was as a matter of fact conceived strictly as an escape valve for the 
tensions caused by the bilateral relationship with the United States, but did not 
survive the change in the international political and economic circumstances of 
the late 1970s.
Since then Brazil’s interaction with the countries of Europe’s western nucleus 
(France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, 
and Belgium) proceeded at two different paces but was gradually normalized, 
consistently with the peculiarities of the bilateral agendas. Contacts with the 
Community as a whole, on the other hand, evolved very little and much more 
slowly: Brazil established diplomatic relations with the Community in 1960 and 
very little happened thereafter. A somewhat limited cooperation agreement with 
the Community was signed twenty years later and entered into force in 1982, but 
was replaced by a Cooperation Framework Agreement in 1995, which was the 
instrument governing contacts between Brazil and the European Community 
until 2007.
In the early 1990s, when integration experiments in South America had 
already advanced, the European Union’s priorities envisaged the establishment 
of an agenda of cooperation with Mercosur. In this regard, the establishment 
of Mercosur in 1991 was a major factor for the reformulation of the European 
Community’s relations with Latin America in general. This can be explained 
by the South American bloc’s emergence as Europe’s major trade partner and 
destination of European investments in the region.
Thus, still in 1992, an inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement was signed, 
which was followed by an Interregional Cooperation Framework Agreement. The 
coordination of interests continued in June 1999 with the first Summit Meeting 
of Heads of State and Chiefs of Government of the European Union and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. On that occasion, a Bi-Regional European Union-
Mercosur Negotiation Committee was established, for the purpose of liberalizing 
trade relations, with a view to the future signing of an inter-regional association 
agreement (Saraiva, 2004). An inter-regional partnership was thus established, 
encompassing the mechanisms of political contacts between the European Union 
and Latin America and the Caribbean (bi-regional summits) and the ministerial 
meetings of the Rio-European Union Group (Valle, 2005).
Brazil’s growing international profile in recent years, coupled with the 
tiredness of the formula of dialogue used by the European Union with Latin 
America and the Caribbean (asymmetry of the integration processes, disparity in 
trade flows, political and economic heterogeneity of the Latin American actors) 
and the stagnation of negotiations with Mercosur led Brussels to abandon the 
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traditional model of cooperation with the region. Thus, in late 2005, the European 
Union, after reviewing its overall relations with Latin America, decided to privilege 
Brazil as the region’s key country.
Brussels view of Latin America was based on a perception of historic and 
structural homogeneity which did not match the region’s political and economic 
circumstances, and this probably impeded the fluidity of the bi-regional dialogue. 
From the aggiornamento of this view came the decision to individualize the political 
relationship with the region’s major countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, which 
would reignite contacts between the two regions, through the definition of clearer 
political objectives (Europe, European Commission, 2005).
The maturing of this view led to the adoption of the model already applied 
to the European Union’s relations with its main interlocutors – the United States, 
Canada, Japan, Russia, China, and India – that is, relations in the form of a 
strategic partnership. As expressed by European diplomacy, these relations are 
characterized by “the range of bilateral contacts and the intensity of political and 
commercial ties and are built on a complex network of institutionalized forums and 
thematic dialogues that incorporate from technical working groups to meetings 
of Heads of State and Chiefs of Government (Barthelmess, 2008).”
It was then recognized that the maintenance of insufficient structures of 
bilateral political dialogue with Brazil was not consistent with the profile the 
country was displaying in international policy, and more specifically, with its 
apparent distancing from Latin American political and economic reality.
The announcement of the Brazil-European Union strategic partnership 
broke the cycle of paralysis of the European policy toward Latin America. The 
announcement took place in Lisbon, on July 4, 2007, on the occasion of the Brazil-
European Union Summit Conference, which brought together the European 
Council’s Troika and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The truth is that this 
new tie is of major importance for Brazil, which although it was not singled out 
among the emerging powers (as a matter of fact it was the last one of them to be 
so distinguished), now has conditions for individualized dialogue as an important 
actor in contemporary international policy (Brasil, MRE, 2007).
The expression “strategic partnership” is rather loosely used in the European 
Union’s jargon and documents. The countries recognized as European Union’s 
strategic partners are indeed privileged political interlocutors, of different statures, 
but acknowledgedly important for the realization of the interests of Europe’s 
international action. Four of the European Union’s strategic partners (Canada, 
United States, Japan, and Russia) form part of the group of major industrial 
countries, the Group of 8; three are permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council (United States, Russia, and China); three (Japan, India, and 
Brazil) aspire to a permanent seat on the Security Council, should the latter be 
reformed; and four (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) are the major emerging 
economies today, and form the bloc known as BRIC.
























Moreover, the European Union is the main trade partner of five of these 
major economies: United States, China, Russia, India, and Brazil. Canada, owing 
to its preferential ties under the NAFTA, and Japan have the United States as 
their main trade partner, followed by the European Community.
conclusion
Brazil’s incorporation into the international scene has undergone major 
adjustments in the Lula era. In addition to new projects, such as southern coalitions, 
as exemplified by the IBSA Forum, and the ambition to win a seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, one can observe a line of continuity with the foreign 
policy of the governments of the 1990s. There has been some change in style, 
which however has not been sufficient to revolutionize Brazil’s international action.
Lula’s Brazil benefited from the consolidation of tendencies of international 
policy from the preceding decade: the ascension of the great markets, the emergence 
and centrality of new issues, and the valorization of multilateral spaces, for 
instance. This has permitted the consolidation of a profile that was being timidly 
sketched and the assumption of a protagonist role in different environments. 
The instrumentation of diplomatic assets recently created or reconverted from 
traditional international praxis has also been highly relevant for the aggiornamento 
of the management of Brazil’s relations with its traditional partners and for the 
building of new partnerships.
The qualifier “strategic” as a synonym of special, important, and necessary 
matches a vision of political and economic cooperation projects based on a sense 
of opportunity but whose effects will last. Thus, Brazil’s strategic partnerships, 
taken into account in an assessment of the Lula government’s foreign policy, may 
be more than tools of an involved diplomacy. They may be associated with shared 
worldviews and sound results for the national development strategy, reinforcing 
the capacity for autonomous international action.
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This article examines the priority bilateral relations of Brazil, named “strategic partnerships”, 
both because of their tradition and historical relevance and due to the existence of political 
and economic cooperation projects. An assessment of these relationships, especially under 
Lula’s administration, is made in this work, bearing in mind the concept of “strategic 
partnerships” and its development in Brazilian foreign policy. There will be considered 
partnerships with the US; Argentina; Japan; China; India; South Africa and the European 
Union. In the article, the meaning of the increase in these relationships is interpreted on 
the grounds of its significance to the international insertion strategy of Brazil.
resumo
No trabalho são examinados os relacionamentos bilaterais prioritários do Brasil, que 
receberam a denominação de “parcerias estratégicas”, tanto por causa da sua tradição e 
relevância histórica, quanto por causa da existência de projetos de cooperação política e 
econômica. A partir da elaboração do conceito de “parcerias estratégicas”, e de como ela 
se construiu na política externa brasileira, neste trabalho se propõe um balanço desses 
relacionamentos especialmente durante a administração Lula da Silva (2003-2010). São 
examinadas as parcerias com os Estados Unidos, Argentina, Japão, China, Índia, África do 
Sul e União Européia. Propõe-se uma interpretação sobre o significado que o incremento 
desses vínculos possui para a estratégia de inserção internacional do País.
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